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Abstract. Can we maintain that purple seems composed of red and blue without 
giving up the impenetrability of the red and blue parts that compose it? Brentano 
thinks we can. Purple, according to him, is a chessboard of red and blue tiles 
which, although individually too small to be perceived, are together indistinctly 
perceived within the purple. After a presentation of Brentano’s solution, we raise 
two objections to it. First, Brentano’s solution commits him to unperceivable 
intentional objects (the chessboard’s tiles). Second, his chessboard account fails in 
the end to explain the phenomenal spatial continuity of compound colours. We 
then sketch an alternative account, which, while holding fast to the phenomenal 
compoundedness of the purple and to the impenetrability of component colours, 
avoids introducing inaccessible intentional objects and compromising on the 
continuity of the purple. According to our proposal, instead of being indistinctly 
perceived spatial parts of the purple, red and blue are distinctly perceived non-
spatial parts of it. 
 
Purple contains red and blue, orange contains red and yellow and (albeit more 
controversially) green contains yellow and blue. “Elementary colours” are colours such 
as yellow, blue, or red, which are not constituted by other colours but can themselves 
constitute other colours; “compound colours,” by contrast, are colours such as green, 
purple, or orange, which are constituted by more elementary colours. A compound 
colour is a colour that consists of a mixture of two or more elementary colours different 
from itself. This paper aims to present and evaluate Brentano’s theory of compound 
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colours, and to sketch an alternative approach to compound colours that, while avoiding 
the pitfalls of Brentano’s own theory, remains strongly Brentanian in spirit. 
Brentano first presented his theory of compound colours (which he calls 
interchangeably multiple Farbe or Mehrfarbe) at a lecture in Munich in 1896, which 
was later transcribed in his Untersuchungen zur Sinnespsychologie (Brentano 2009, 
127–160) under the title “On individuation, compound quality and the intensity of 
sensory appearances.” Although the question of compound colours may at first seem 
limited in scope, the theory that Brentano drew from its study—whose driving intuition, 
as we shall see, is that of the indistinct perception of a chessboard of small coloured 
squares—was to play central role in multiple areas of his later psychological and 
metaphysical research. Even in the initial text Brentano applies his theory of compound 
colours to the perception of sound chords and uses it to account for the intensity of 
sensations. Later on, he will recurrently come back to his account of compound colours, 
so as to account for internal perception (Brentano 1911, 127-130; English translation 
1995a, 275-278)1 and for the perception of contact and continuity (Brentano 1988, 8, 
147), which will play a central role in his metaphysics of the continuous. 
Brentano’s theory is concerned with colours that are phenomenally compound. There 
are indeed two types of compound colours, which correspond respectively to two types 
of mixtures. First, there are colours that are physically compound, which correspond to 
mixtures of physical colours. For instance, on the macroscopic physical level that is of 
interest to painters, green is a mixture of yellow and blue pigments. Then there are 
colours that are phenomenally compound: they are compound in the sense that they 
appear to be compounds of more elementary colours to the perceiving subject. Brentano 
is here interested in this second type of complexity—phenomenal complexity, 
henceforth complexity tout court, which may be defined as follows: 
                                                
1 For discussion of this point, see Mulligan (2004), Textor (2006, 2012). 
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(Phenomenal) Complexity: compound colours—purple, orange, green…—are 
phenomenal colours that are presented as being composed of at least two other 
phenomenal colours. 2 
The colours examined in Brentano’s descriptive psychology are all phenomenal colours, 
i.e., colours as they appear to us independently of how they relate to the underlying 
optical and biological episodes 3 . Henceforth, we shall use “colour” to mean 
“phenomenal colour,” and “compound colour” to mean “phenomenally compound 
colour.” 
Once we have presented the problem posed by compound colours in the eyes of 
Brentano (§1), we will present his solution to the problem (§2). Then we will raise two 
objections against his theory (§3) before finally sketching an alternative solution (§4). 
 
1. The Problem: Reconciling the Complexity and the Impenetrability of Colours 
There were two main approaches to compound colours available at the time of 
Brentano’s investigations, which he introduces as follows: 
Cases of multiples qualities (such as musical chords [Mehrklänge], colour shades 
in which several colours comes into play, etc.)  have led many [respectable 
researchers] to believe in the possibility of an interpenetration [of qualities]. 
Others have preferred to explain that in such cases, the multiplicity itself does not 
exist. (2009, 132) 
Let us call the first theory the “Compenetration theory”; and the second, the “Simplicity 
theory.” According to the compenetration theory, compound colours consist of a 
compenetration—that is, exact co-location—of the composing colours. Two colours, 
yellow and blue for example, can cover the exact same portion of visual space at the 
very same time.  More generally, multiple sensory qualities of the same type (e.g., 
multiple sounds in a chord) can be perceived as occupying one and the same location in 
a sensory space at the same time. On this theory, purple, for instance, would be 
                                                
2 Brentano (2009, 93) makes explicit this notion of phenomenal composition in his lecture on phenomenal 
green. For a detailed examination of the concept of phenomenal composition, see Nida-Rümelin and 
Suarez (2009). 
3 They corresponds to what Chalmers (2006) calls “perfect colours”: the colours as they are revealed to us 
in experience independently of any consideration about science or veridicality. 
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constituted by red and blue colours located in exactly the same place at the same time.4 
The colours that compose a compound colour genuinely compenetrate each other. The 
Compenetration theory therefore violates the impenetrability (Undurchdringlichkeit) of 
colours, which we define at first approximation thus (a refined definition shall be given 
in §1.2): 
Impenetrability: it is impossible for two colours to fill exactly the same area at 
exactly the same time. 
According to the simplicity theory, on the other hand, the qualities that we think of as 
compound are in reality simple. Two reasons have been advanced, Brentano notices, in 
order to explain why simple qualities may wrongly be considered as compound 
(Brentano, 2009 132; 148–9 n. 2; 205–7). 
The first is that “certain simple qualities are characterized and named in relation to 
several other qualities in between which they occupy some sort of middle position.” 
(2009, 132). Compound colours would thus be simple colours described as lying 
between other simple colours in some resemblance order. For example, orange can be 
described as lying between yellow and red but this does not mean that yellow and red 
are somehow “in” the orange, that they are constituents of it. Alleged compound 
qualities (multiple Qualitäten) are, according to the simplicity theory, only intermediary 
qualities (Zwischenqualitäten). 
A second explanation advanced by upholders of the simplicity theory, according to 
Brentano, is that we tend to consider as compound, actually simple colours which result 
from some complex causes (“antecedent conditions” —Vorbedingungen), whose parts, 
when occurring alone, cause the appearance of distinct simple colours5. Thus, if a, 
alone, causes the appearance of some blue shade; if b, alone, causes the appearance of 
some red shade; and if a and b, together, cause the appearance of some purple shade, 
one will be tempted to consider, erroneously, the purple shade as composed of the red 
and blue ones. 
                                                
4 Although Brentano does not mention it, the Compenetration Theory of phenomenal colours displays 
clear affinities with the Stoic view of physical mixtures (see Alexander, On Mixture, in Long & Sedley, 
1987). 
5 This proposal, for its part, displays clear affinities with Buridan (2010)’s account of mixtures. 
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Brentano mentions two ways in which such a complexity of causes, according to the 
simplicity theory, ends up being misleadingly attributed to the phenomenal colour in 
which they result. The first is that we may consider as compound, colours which we 
think of as resulting from some mixing of pigments.6 We know that the painter mixed 
red and yellow pigments, and as a result, we believe, falsely, that orange is 
phenomenally compound of orange and yellow (2009, 148-149 n.2). 
In a short appendix to his Untersuchungen zur Sinnespsychologie entitled “On the 
question of multiple qualities” (2009, 205-206),  Brentano mentions a second way in 
which, according to the simplicity theory, the complexity of causes might get 
erroneously projected onto the appearances they brings about. Simplicity theorists, he 
writes, also argue that one tends to consider as compound colours, the colours that result 
from complex physiological processes, when such complex processes are composed of 
simple processes, each of which, in isolation, yields the appearing of some simple 
colour. 
On the whole, therefore, Simplicity theory is an error-theory about compound colours: it 
denies that any colour is phenomenally compound— it rejects Complexity— and 
replaces the distinction between elementary and compound colours by some other 
distinction between two kinds of simple colours. In a first version, the simplicity theory 
replaces the elementary/compound distinction by the distinction between bounding and 
intermediary colours; in a second version, it replaces the elementary/compound 
distinction by the distinction between simple colours resulting from simple or complex 
causal antecedent. That second version comes itself in two sub-versions, one focusing 
on distal causes—pigmentary stimuli—; the other focusing on proximal causes—
physiological processes. 
As Brentano urges, Compenetration theory saves compound colours at the price of 
abandoning the impenetrability of colours; and Simplicity theory saves the 
impenetrability of colours at the price of abandoning compound colours. These are two 
costs that Brentano is unwilling to pay. As we shall now see, it is crucial for Brentano to 
maintain both the reality of compound colours and the impenetrability of colours. 
 
                                                
6 The distinction between the act of mixing and the resulting mixture is underlined by Fine (1998). 
 6 
1.1 The reality of compound qualities 
“The complexity exists in reality, without any doubt” (2009, 132), says Brentano with 
respect to colours and other qualities. Two qualifications are required. By “existence in 
reality” Brentano doesn’t mean that compound colours exist in a manner that would be 
independent of the perception we have thereof. All colours of interest to Brentano are 
phenomenal colours, and he conceives of these intentional objects as not existing 
independently of the perception that we have of them (1995a, 10, 19, 88n.1, 92; 1995b, 
17; 1981a, 208). The reality of compound colours is a psychological reality: there are 
genuine appearances of compound colours. The appearance of complexity cannot be 
explained away by appealing to similarity relations to other colours or to the genesis of 
compound colours (as simplicity theories have it). Purple, in and of itself, seems 
composed of blue and red. Within the family of phenomenal colours, some seem simple 
or elementary, while others appear to us complex or compound. Why, however, should 
we accept this distinction? Why endorse Complexity? Brentano here follows the lead of 
Hering (1878), whose opponent process model crucially relies on the distinction 
between unary and binary nuances. 
However, although Brentano honours Hering, he disagrees with him when it comes to 
the nature of green. According to Hering, pure green, together with pure red, blue, and 
yellow, is one of the four elementary colours: green is opposed to red while blue is 
opposed to yellow. Binary colours are those that are located between these pure colours 
according to these axes of opposition. Orange and purple are then, contrary to green, 
binary colours. Brentano, on the contrary, holds that green is a compound colour. This 
is a controversial position that we shall not discuss here.7 
It is important not to conflate the formal question—that we are concerned with here—of 
what compound colours are with the material question about which compound colours 
there are. The material question is important, for instance when it comes to determining 
the structure of the colour space. The simple or elementary colours typically occupy 
                                                
7 On this point, see Bouveresse (2004, Chap. 6) as well as Nida-Rümelin and Suarez (2009).  
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polar positions 8  therein. However, in the chapter under consideration, Brentano’s 
interest touches the material question only incidentally—he examines it in detail in the 
preceding chapter entitled “On phenomenal green” (2009, 85–126)—; he rather focuses 
on investigating the question about what compound colours consists of whichever they 
be. 
Still, this (material) disagreement between Brentano and Hering about the status of the 
green connects with our present (formal) question about the existence and nature of 
compound colours in the following way:  the very existence of this debate, one may 
argue, shows that the status of a phenomenal colour as mixture is not exactly 
phenomenologically obvious. If even Brentano and Hering fail to agree on which 
colours are complex, shouldn’t we give up Complexity and embrace the Simplicity 
theory? 
Such scepticism, however, remains a minority view within colour science. The 
distinction between elementary and compound colours has proved quite fruitful, 9 and 
remains widely accepted —albeit not universally.10 Two chief experimental paradigms 
motivate its acceptance. The first is constituted by colour cancellation experiments, 
along with Hering’s opponent process theory,11 to the effect that in a compound colour 
(i.e. purple), it is possible to cancel out one of the component colours (i.e., blue) by 
adding its opponent colour (yellow), leaving only the other compound colour apparent 
(red). The second experimental paradigm supporting the distinction between elementary 
and compound colours pertains to colour naming12 and tends to show that only terms of 
elementary colours prove necessary to describe to whole colour spectrum.13 
                                                
8  On the topic of different possible representations of the colour space, and of Meinong’s and 
Wittgenstein’s conception of compound colours, see Mulligan (1991), Bouveresse (2004, Chap. 7) and 
Seron (in press). 
9 For recent philosophical discussion on this topic, see in particular Hardin (1988, 2008); Byrne & Hilbert 
(2008); Allen (2011).  
10 See Mizrahi (2009) for a recent critic of the distinction, and defence of the first version of the simplicity 
theory. 
11 Following Hurvich and Jameson (1957).   
12 Following Sternheim and Boynton (1966).  
13 See again Mizrahi (2009) for a critical presentation of both paradigms. 
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But Brentano does not appeal to such experiments— and in fact, could not do so, since 
both experimental paradigms rely on the hypothesis that green is a simple colour. What 
then does motivate his acceptance of the simple/compound distinction within the colour 
realm? 
The first argument advanced by Brentano is negative: each version of the Simplicity 
theory, he argues, face insuperable difficulties (2009, 148-149n.2). Take, first, the view 
that multiple qualities are nothing more than simple Zwischenqualitäten (“in-between 
qualities”). Brentano objects that we do not usually take intermediaries to be complexes 
made of the entities that bound them. Nobody takes the note C♯ to be a chord composed 
of the notes C and D. 
Likewise, with respect to the division of time, nobody would say that the time we 
call 1:30 is less simple than the times that we call 1:00 or 2:00, or to consider it as 
composed from these two times because of its relative determination and 
dependent denomination. (2009, 148) 
In a similar vein, Brentano objects to the second version of the Simplicity theory —the 
one that appeals to the complexity of causal antecedents— that not any colour 
appearance caused by a mixture of pigments is taken to be a compound colour: 
Were the painter to consider the orange to be a reddish-yellow because he can 
obtain such a pigment by mixing red and yellow, should he also consider the grey 
mixture obtained from red and green to be a reddish-green, and the green mixture 
obtained by mixing black and yellow to be a yellowish-black. But this is not what 
he does. (2009, 149) 
On top of these two objections to each version of the Simplicity theory, Brentano 
develops a distinct objection to the first version of the theory —the one that appeals to 
intermediary qualities. According to him (2009, 205–6), the theory that identifies 
compound qualities with intermediary qualities suffers from an internal inconsistency.14 
His argument is this. If orange is simply an intermediary quality deprived of internal 
complexity, there is no reason for the line on which it lies to be bound by a yellow point 
on the one side and at a red point on the other. For since all qualities are equally simple, 
                                                
14 On this point, see Bouveresse (2004, 284)15 See Johansson (2000) for a defence of this thesis and 
Massin, (2013) for a critic.  
 9 
after yellow, one might continue towards green; and after red one might continue 
towards purple. Hence, Brentano argues, on this view every possible difference between 
compound and elementary qualities vanishes, as every colour becomes intermediary 
relative to some others—e.g. red is in between orange and purple. According to 
Brentano, therefore, the theory of intermediary qualities ends up abolishing the 
distinction between the bounding and intermediaries qualities on which it crucially 
relies. More generally, the upshot of Brentano’s argument is that quality spaces cannot 
be structured —in the sense of being bounded by special points or corners— if one 
rejects multiple qualities. 
We shall in what follows grant Brentano’s thesis that compound colours exist. Our goal 
is not to assess Brentano’s arguments in favour of compound colours, but Brentano’s 
proposal to reconcile the existence of compound colours with the impenetrability of 
colours. 
 
1.2 The impenetrability of qualities 
According to Brentano, “a quality is impenetrable by other qualities in the sensory 
space” (2009, 132). No two colours can be located at the exact same place. Although 
Brentano doesn’t explicitly dwell on this point in the text, it is important—in the light of 
theses that he defends elsewhere—to restrict this impenetrability thesis to colours that, 
on the one hand, are maximally determinate and, on the other, have the same direction, 
or plerosis. Let us explain. 
Determinate colours. First of all, impenetrability holds true only for determinate 
colours: this particular nuance of red, that particular green—in opposition to 
determinable colours such as red, green, or ‘colourful’. One needs to distinguish the 
problem of co-location of different determinate colours from the problem of co-location 
of a determinate colour with the determinable colour under which it falls. It may be that 
garnet red and generic red are colours of a different level of determination that both 
entirely cover the surface of a ladybird. This, at least, is the conclusion sometimes 
reached by those who defend, over and above the existence of determinate colours, that 
of determinable colours.15 Brentano could well be one of them:16 If Brentano is indeed 
                                                
15 See Johansson (2000) for a defence of this thesis and Massin, (2013) for a critic.  
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realist about determinable colours, he probably needs to admit that determinable and 
determinate colours are not impenetrable by one another.17 This does not lead to 
inconsistency, for it is not this kind of compenetration that poses problems for Brentano. 
The compenetration that poses problem is the one that relates different determinate 
colours. In this context, a compound colour is itself a determinate colour, which is 
phenomenally composed of two other determinate colours.18 When we speak of a 
“colour,” “green” or “yellow,” we thereby mean not only phenomenal colours, but 
maximally determinate phenomenal colours. 
Colours of one and the same bearer. Second, colours that are impenetrable in 
Brentano’s sense must be determinate colours that have the same direction, or 
“plerosis.” The problem—which Brentano does not mention in the Untersuchungen zur 
Sinnespsychologie but considers in detail in Philosophische Untersuchungen zu Raum, 
Zeit und Kontinuum (—stems from the fact that things of different colours can come 
into contact. Most of the time, phenomenal colours are surface colours.19 Surfaces are 
bi-dimensional entities that constitute the boundaries of things. According to Brentano’s 
theory of the continuous, whenever two things touch, their boundaries overlap and are 
exactly co-located.20 When these boundaries are surfaces, and when they are coloured, 
then Brentano admits that two colours are located at the exact same place at the same 
time: “If a red and a blue surface are in contact with each other then a red and a blue 
                                                                                                                                          
16 See Brentano (1982 14–20); an interpretation in this sense is suggested by Mulligan & Smith (1985). 
17 However, this consequence doesn’t follow immediately, since it is possible in principle to maintain 
that, while determinate colours are located in space, determinable colours aren’t, or are so only in a 
derivative manner (we will come back to derivative location in the fourth part of this article).  
18 There may be a sense in which determinable red is composed of grenadine, carmine, magenta, etc. This 
doesn’t turn determinable red into a compound colour in the sense that is of interest to us here, though. 
Indeed, when we say that determinable red is “constituted” by grenadine, carmine, magenta, etc., we say 
that red is either grenadine, or carmine, or magenta…: if determinables are constituted by determinates, 
they are constituted by disjunctions of determinates (Massin, 2013). Inversely, when we say that green is 
“constituted” by yellow and blue, we have in mind a conjunctive or aggregative sense of constitution: 
what is green is both yellow and blue at the same time.  
19 Not always, though: there exist voluminous colours as well, as has remarked early by Katz (1935).  
20 On Brentano’s theory of contact, which is on the basis of his theory of the continuous, see Chisholm 
(1980), Zimmermann (1996), Varzi (1997).  
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line coincide, each with different plerosis” (1976, 51–2, see also 15–17; English 
translation 1988, 41; see also 10-12). 
When we put a blue book on a red book, Brentano claims that a red and a blue surface 
coincide exactly. Yet this coincidence is compatible with the impenetrability of 
(determinate, phenomenal) colours since the surfaces have a different direction 
(plerosis): One of them bounds the red book, while the other bounds the blue book. For 
the impenetrability of colours to be violated, the surface of one and the same book 
would need to be both red and blue. 
To Brentano, therefore, the colours are impenetrable only when it comes to determinate 
colours having the same direction, i.e., determinate colours bounding the same entities. 
Let us call “impenetrability,” the view to which he subscribes: 
 
Impenetrability: it impossible for two determinate colours of a same bearer to fill 
exactly the same area at exactly the same time. 
 
Why does Brentano accept the impenetrability of colours, and more generally, of 
sensory qualities? The corresponding thesis about physical bodies seems quite intuitive, 
but determinate colours certainly to not repel each other by exerting some repulsive 
force, so an argument might be expected. 
Brentano presents the impenetrability of colours as having a tight link to the principle of 
spatial individuation of qualities, according to which sensory qualities are individuated 
by their respective positions in the sensory space. Thus, two qualitatively identical 
sensory objects that occur at the same time must have distinct locations (2009, 129). 
Thus, it might first seem that, according to him, the impenetrability of sensory qualities 
is grounded on some individuation principle. This initially tempting reading is, we shall 
now argue, erroneous. As far as we can see, Brentano offers no argument for the 
impenetrability of qualities: it takes it to be immediately obvious. 
What exactly is the link between the impenetrability of colours and the principle of 
spatial individuation for sensory objects? Since Brentano claims in the appendix to 
Kategorienlehre that the impenetrability of bodies is explained by the principle of 
spatial individuation, it is natural to think that the latter grounds the former for qualities 
as well. There he adopts a strong interpretation of the principle of spatial individuation 
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for physical bodies by equating bodies to sub-regions of a unique spatial substance.21 
Accordingly, in a chapter entitled “The impenetrability of bodies is grounded in the fact 
that the spatial determinations are substantial and individualising” (1976, 178–184), 
Brentano derives the impenetrability of bodies from this principle of spatial 
individuation. He suggests that the essence of bodies consists solely in their spatial and 
temporal properties, and that their other physical and chemical properties are but 
accidental. If this theory is true, he adds, then any two bodies that exist in the same 
place at the same time are by nature one and the same. Nothing could be used to 
distinguish them from each other. 
It is even more natural to think that this explanation of the impenetrability of bodies by 
the principle of spatial individuation generalizes to the impenetrability of sensory 
qualities, since in that very chapter of the Philosophische Untersuchungen zu Raum, 
Zeit und Kontinuum, Brentano alludes to the theory of the intensity of sensory qualities 
developed in the Untersuchungen zur Sinnespsychologie. What is more, Brentano 
makes an explicit comparison between the impenetrability of qualities and physical 
impenetrability in this chapter: “In the same way as matter is impenetrable by matter in 
the real space, in the sensory space quality is impenetrable by quality” (2009 132). 
The parallel between psychology and metaphysics thus seems perfect: in the same way 
as, in real space, the principle of spatial individuation of bodies grounds their 
impenetrability, in the sensory space the principle of spatial individuation of qualities 
grounds their impenetrability. 
However, as tempting as it may be, this interpretation of Brentano’s position is 
erroneous, we believe. While on the metaphysical level the principle of spatial 
individuation grounds the impenetrability of bodies, it is the impenetrability of 
sensations that grounds the principle of individuation of sensory qualities on the 
phenomenal level: “It is precisely in virtue of this impenetrability that the sensory space, 
                                                
21 On the topic of Brentano’s late ontology, see Smith (1989) and Schultess (1999). The later view of 
Brentano is a precursor of the contemporary view referred to as “supersubstantivalism,” according to 
which objects are nothing by spatio-temporal regions (see Sider, 2001; Schaffer, 2009) 
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in opposition to other moments of sensation, is the most suited to individuate sensory 
qualities” (2009, 132, our emphasis). 
Where does the asymmetry come from? The reason for it lies in the fact that while 
sensory objects are regions of the sensory space and necessarily bear some sensory 
qualities such as sounds or colours22, physical bodies, in Brentano’s late ontology, are 
possibly empty regions of space and time. In both cases the space is the bearer of 
physical properties and sensory qualities. But while the non-spatial properties are but 
accidents of bodies, they are essential to (most) sensory objects: a body is a location in a 
physical space, while a sensory object is not just a location in a sensory space, but a 
filled location, a quality-at-a-place.23 In other words, a sensory object has spatial 
determinations, but also qualitative ones. This difference inverses the relationship 
between the principle of spatial individuation and impenetrability for the following 
reason: If bodies are but spatial regions, it is impossible by definition for two of them to 
be located in the same place at the same time. Spatial individuation grounds 
impenetrability. If, in contrast, sensory objects have both spatial determinations 
(locations) and qualitative determinations (colours), two different sensory objects can, 
in principle, be located at the same place at the same time provided their qualitative 
determinations differ. Their numerical difference is not threatened by the fact that they 
occupy the same place, as long as it is grounded in their qualitative difference. Because 
sensory objects are in that sense thicker than bodies, the principle of spatial 
individuation for sensory objects only ensures that qualitatively identical sensory 
objects cannot be located in the same place at the same time. But by itself it doesn’t 
preclude two sensory objects of distinct colours from being co-located. This fact only 
follows from the impenetrability of colours: if phenomenal yellow and red cannot be in 
the same place at the same time, this is not in virtue of the principle of spatial 
individuation, but in virtue of their impenetrability. 
As a result, the principle of the spatial individuation of sensory objects cannot ground 
the impenetrability of colours. Brentano needs to consider the impenetrability of colours 
as independent of, and more fundamental than, the spatial individuation of visual 
                                                
22 For details, see Massin (to appear). 
23 Brentano’s view is here akin to the view defended by Clark (2000). 
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objects: it is because of the impenetrability of colours that we can count coloured 
objects by counting coloured locations in the sensory space. The impenetrability of 
colours, therefore, is a kind of brute impossibility for Brentano. 
To sum up, Brentano wants to preserve both the existence of compound colours and the 
impenetrability of determinate colours of a same bearer. This position immediately 
gives rise to an important paradox: How can purple, to take an example, be composed of 
blue and red without them being located in the same place at the same time? 
 
2. Brentano’s Solution: the Chessboard 
2.1 Presentation 
Here is how Brentano attempts to reconcile Impenetrability and Complexity: 
[O]ne can very easily reconcile these appearances [of compound qualities] with 
the impenetrability of qualities. To do so, one only needs to remember that there 
is a threshold of perceptibility [dass es für die Merklichkeit eine Schwelle gibt]. 
Hence, in the case of co-location of distinct qualities in the sensory space, an 
imperceptibility of the distances will be possible; it will be possible for a 
sensation to have imperceptibly small parts alternating in qualities. In such a 
case, the multiplicity of the parts will appear to the subject who perceives 
indistinctly [undeutlich], while the particularity of their distribution will remain 
hidden to him. (2009, 132–3; Brentano’s italics) 
So Brentano explains the complexity of qualities by a particular distribution of simple 
qualities in the sensory space. The qualities are distributed in such fine a manner that a 
confused or indistinct perception [undeutliche Perzeption]  won’t present the details of 
the distribution. Note that for Brentano, to say that the red and blue parts that compose 
the purple extent are indistinctly perceived, is not to say they their distinctness is not 
perceived. It clearly is: “the multiplicity of the parts will appear to the subject who 
perceives indistinctly [undeutlich]”. It is rather to say that their exact spatial localisation 
is not perceived: “the particularity of their distribution will remain hidden to him”. The 
red and blue parts are perceived as distinct components of the purple extent, which exist 
somewhere within it, although where exactly they are in the purple extent remains 
inaccessible through perception. Hence, we perceive a colour as compound (orange, for 
example), when our phenomenal visual space is divided into very fine parts that are 
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alternately filled with different simple colours (red and yellow). This distribution can be 
refined to a degree that is impossible for us to apprehend. 
If we were to split up the subjective space of visual sensations into a chessboard 
of imperceptibly small squares [schachbrettartig], alternately red and blue, when 
having some sensation, then, as a consequence of what has been said so far, one 
would apprehend but the equal participation of both colours to the whole, which 
would appear as a medium purple. (Brentano 2009, 134) 
A colour appears simple to us, in contrast, when all squares of the chessboard contain 
the same colour, e.g., yellow. 
Brentano’s presentation of his solution is very succinct, and is basically limited to these 
two passages (the remainder of the lecture consists of applying this solution to different 
examples, and of showing how it allows us to explain the intensity of non-visual 
sensations, too). This brevity is surely due to the fact that Brentano considers his 
solution to be “very simple.” Brentano reformulates his chessboard account in several 
later texts.24 One of the clearest and most detailed reformulations is to be found in the 
text “On what is continuous?” dictated eighteen years later. There, having described a 
chessboard of individually unnoticeable blue and red squares, Brentano wonders: 
But would we then see nothing at all? Not in the least; rather we would see the 
whole chessboard as purple, i.e. apprehend it as something that participates 
simultaneously in red and in blue; though of course not, strictly speaking, in the 
same positions, since red and blue do after all, as contrasting colours, exclude 
each other mutually. Thus one would indeed be able to say that both red and blue 
positions were to be found therein. But one would not be able to go beyond this 
general determination so far as to be able to determine down to the last details 
whether this or that point would belong to the red or to the blue ones. We see, 
therefore, that the limitation of our capacity to differentiate what is indisputably 
                                                
24 Untersuchungen zur Sinnespsychologie (2009 102), Kategorienlehre (1985 81; English translation 
1981a 67-70), Philosophische Untersuchungen zu Raum, Zeit und Kontinuum (1976 12, 175, 180;  
English translation 1988 8, 147, 152); Von der Klassifikation der psychischen Phänomene (1911 129 
English translation 1995a 275–278); Sensory and Noetic Consciousness (1981b 50-1); Descriptive 
Psychology (1995b 50, 122).  
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involved here does not deprive us of the possibility of asserting with all certainty 
that the surfaces before us are here and here red, there and there blue. (Brentano 
1988, 8) 
It is possible, then, on Brentano’s view, to apprehend the distinctness of the component 
colours, without apprehending their exact spatial distribution. It is this possibility of 
such an indistinct perception of the location of component colours that allows Brentano 
to reconcile the Impenetrability and the Complexity of colours. 
Furthermore, the hypothesis that the sensory space is constituted by locations too small 
to pass the threshold of perceptibility allows Brentano not only to solve the problem of 
compound qualities, but also to explain the differences in the intensity of perceived 
qualities: The more empty parts there are, the lower the intensity of a perceived quality. 
Brentano notes (2009, 134) that the existence of phenomenally empty positions is 
nonetheless impossible in the case of vision (while it is possible in the case of other 
senses), since the absence of colour corresponds to a phenomenally positive colour: 
black (conversely, locations of the auditory field can contain no sound; silence, contrary 
to the colour black, is no sound). According to Brentano, this particularity of vision 
turns out to support his theory of intensity, since vision—as Hering noted earlier—is the 
only sense where no differences in intensity can be found (2009, 135). 
To summarize, Brentano proposes to reconcile the impenetrability of colours with the 
existence of compound colours by embracing the idea that the visual space is 
constituted by coloured places that cannot be distinctly perceived. 
 
2.2 The role of indistinct perception: dismissing a possible misunderstanding 
Recall that Brentano’s aim is to account for phenomenally compound colours, and not 
for physically compound colours such as painters’ mixtures. Brentano’s chessboard 
solution may seem to account for the question of compound colours’ physical nature 
rather than for that of their phenomenology. Indeed, it is tempting to understand the 
chessboard as constituting the microscopic physical structure of compound colours. 
However, nothing could be further from Brentano’s thinking. His chessboard is not a 
chessboard of chemical pigments or spectral colours. It is a mental chessboard, an 
intentional in-existent object. No optical instrument could be used to reveal its details. 
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One might then be tempted to raise the two following objections (which, we believe, are 
misguided). First, how can the chessboard be an intentional in-existent object if it is 
situated below our threshold of perceptibility? Second, how can the chessboard help 
explain the appearance of complexity if it is inaccessible to perception? The second 
objection may be expanded as follows: 
P1: What distinguishes compound from simple colours is their spatial 
constitution: the former consist in an alternation of various simple colours, while 
the latter consist in one and the same simple colour. 
P2: This spatial constitution does not appear to the perceiving subject, as it is 
located below the threshold of perceptibility. 
C: Hence, what distinguishes compound from simple colours does not appear to 
the perceiving subject. 
This argument, if sound, would constitute a reductio of Brentano’s theory, as its 
conclusion violates Complexity, which the theory is meant to explain. 
Both objections fail, for they don’t take into account the difference between distinct and 
indistinct perception, which lies at the heart of Brentano’s solution. What is it to 
indistinctly perceive a mosaic of red and blue tiles? Brentano’s response is worth citing 
again: “the multiplicity of the parts will appear to the subject who perceives indistinctly, 
while the particularity of their distribution will remain hidden to him” (2009, 133). 
To perceive the chessboard of colours indistinctly, it is therefore necessary to: 
(i) fail to perceive the particular spatial distribution of the colours within the 
chessboard. The chessboard is not presented to us distinctly, as its parts are 
“imperceptibly small.”  Sensory space is constituted, in Brentano’s view, by 
locations that are too small to be individually perceived; 
(ii) still perceive the chessboard as being constituted by multiple parts. 
In other words, purple is a phenomenally compound colour because it is presented to us 
as having red and blue parts, whose exact location, however, remains hidden. We see 
purple as constituted by red and blue spatial parts without seeing their distribution in the 
form of a chessboard, i.e., without seeing the precise location of each and every one of 
these parts. 
Indistinct perception allows us to answer the two objections above (to recall: first, how 
can the chessboard be an intentional in-existent object if it is situated below our 
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threshold of perceptibility? Second how can the chessboard help explain the appearance 
of complexity if it is inaccessible to perception?). First, the reason why the chessboard 
of colours can be in-existent without being distinctly perceived is that it is still 
indistinctly perceived. The chessboard is clearly not perceived as a chessboard, since 
the specific spatial distribution of its tiles is not perceived at all; but the chessboard is 
still what is perceived, albeit indistinctly. 
Second, plugging the distinction between distinct and indistinct perception into the 
second objection above yields the following argument, which no longer constitutes a 
reductio of Brentano’s solution: 
P1: What distinguishes compound colours from simple colours is their spatial 
constitution: the former consists in an alternation of various simple colours, while 
the latter consists in one and the same simple colour. 
P2’: This spatial constitution does not appear distinctly but does appear 
indistinctly to the perceiving subject, as it is located below the threshold of 
perceptibility. 
C’: Hence, what distinguishes compound colours from simple colours does not 
appear distinctly but does appear indistinctly to the perceiving subject. 
Brentano would happily accept this conclusion. Denying that the specific spatial 
distribution of colours is distinctively perceived does not entail that it is not perceived at 
all.  According to him, we indistinctly perceive the chessboard, without being able to 
distinguish its different parts. When Brentano says that the spatial distribution of 
component colours lies below the threshold of perceptibility, he clearly wants to 
maintain that it is nevertheless perceived indistinctly. The upshot is that, for Brentano, 
the phenomenology of perception is not exhausted by the phenomenology of distinct 
perception. We can perceive the red and blue parts of a purple extent without distinctly 
perceiving them, that is, without making out their specific spatial distribution. 
 
 
3. Criticism of Brentano’s Solution 
There are however, we believe, two more conclusive objections against Brentano’s 
account of compound colours. The first argues that, notwithstanding the above, 
Brentano’s account is, in the end, committed to there being in-existent colour patches 
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that are inaccessible to any kind of perception, distinct or indistinct. The second 
objection purports to show that Brentano’s chessboard runs afoul of the plausible thesis 
—which Brentano appears to accept— that purple is seen as spatially continuous. 
 
3.1 Imperceptible phenomenal colours 
According to Brentano, intentional objects in general, and colours in particular, do not 
exist independently of the perception we have of them. On this particular question, 
Brentano indeed supports Locke's theory of the veil of ideas. Anachronistic as it may 
seem, it is natural to assimilate Brentano’s theory to Russell’s theory of sense-data of 
1912, which clearly alludes to Brentano’s theory of intentionality.25 Sense-data, like 
Brentano’s intentional objects, are dependent on the consciousness that we have of 
them; and both are distinct from the physical reality that exists beyond ourselves. 
Yet despite this striking proximity, Brentano’s view on compound colours displays a 
fundamental divergence from Russell’s theory of sense-data. According to the latter 
theory, the nature of sense-data is entirely revealed to us in our experience. According 
to Brentano, on the contrary, we do not entirely get to know compound colours by 
seeing them. We can extend our knowledge of them theoretically: Brentano’s 
chessboard hypothesis contributes to such an extension of our knowledge. Brentano’s 
chessboard is in itself under-determined by experience. Perception, in and of itself, does 
not allow us to tell that purple consists of alternating parcels of red and blue located in 
such and such a place. In fact, no good grounds can be had for answering one way or 
the other questions such as: are the elements of the chessboard squarish or are they 
hexagonal or triangular? Do they lie in staggered or aligned rows? Is their size the 
biggest size possible below the threshold of perceptibility, or are they even smaller?  
Does the chessboard alternate between one red square and one blue square, or rather 
between two red squares and two blue squares? Do the squares move? The answer is not 
to be found in perception itself (it is unclear in fact that even extra-perceptual 
considerations could help us answer such questions, since a wide variety of 
“chessboards” could play the very same explanatory role). 
                                                
25 Russell (2001). 
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Thus, although Brentano, like Russell, is interested in phenomenal colours as they are 
presented to us in perception, his account relies on a distinction between purple as it is 
and purple as it appears. To be sure, Brentano does not think the appearances of purple 
are deceptive. What is presented to us when we see purple—that it is constituted of red 
and blue— is veridical, but partial: not all there is to know about purple is presented to 
us in perception: the spatial location of its elementary parts eludes us. By introducing, 
within the realm of in-existent intentional objects itself, whose “esse est percipi” a 
distinction between appearance and reality, suggesting—in Russell’s terms—that sense-
data are but partially revealed in experience, Brentano’s theory clearly gains some 
explanatory power: it promises to explain compound qualities and the intensity of 
sensations, among other things. As long as appearances of colours are not illusory but 
only partial, one might think, no problem ensues for the view that colours are mind-
dependent objects. Yet, if what we see of colours is only part of what they are, then 
there has to be another part of colours that irremediably escapes us. This inaccessible, 
residual, part of the nature of colours, we want to press, cannot plausibly be held to be 
in-existent. 
The problem arises when we think of one isolated square of the chessboard. Although 
the spatially heterogeneous parts of the chessboard that make up a compound colour are, 
according to Brentano, collectively perceived via indistinct perception, his theory 
implies that none of these parts can be individually perceived, be it distinctly or 
indistinctly. We have indeed noted that one of the essential conditions of indistinct 
perception lies precisely in the fact of not being able to access individual parts of the 
chessboard: only the chessboard as a whole can be indistinctly perceived. As a result, 
each individual blue part that constitutes the chessboard of purple is, in and of itself, too 
small to be perceived in any way. How then can an individual blue square be an 
intentionally in-existent object? How can it depend on the perception we have of it 
when it is, in Brentano’s own terms, “imperceptibly small”? This theory leads to realism 
about colours, which Brentano officially rejects. Thus it seems that Brentano needs to 
admit that the atoms that constitute sensory space exist independently of the perception 
that we have of them⎯at least if he maintains that they are too small to be individually 
perceptible, distinctly or indistinctly. 
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One option would be for Brentano to weaken his anti-realism about sensory qualities in 
the following way: Colours depend for their existence either on the experience that we 
have of them, or on the perception that we have of the wholes of which they are parts. 
Thus as long as an individual blue square is a member of a collection of blue squares, 
which can be—at least indistinctly—perceived, the individual blue square could be 
maintained to be intentionally in-existent. On this proposal, although there could be no 
colours without perception, there could be imperceptible colours: the coloured squares 
that constitute the colour extents that we perceive—e.g., the blue tile that is a part of the 
purple colour that we see.  That proposal has a strongly holistic flavour: the squares of 
the chessboard could not exist without being part of the chessboard. A solitary blue 
square, too small to be noticed, would be metaphysically impossible. It could exist only 
if appropriately surrounded. It is unclear to us whether Brentano’s would have 
subscribed to such a holistic reading of his proposal,26 and whether the chessboard 
analogy remains intelligible within such a holistic context. Be that as it may, Brentano’s 
account of compound colours faces a second objection. 
 
3.2. Phenomenal continuity lost 
According to Brentano, indistinct perception is not erroneous but only partial. 
Brentano’s view is not that through indistinct perception we see something that is not 
the case; it is instead that we fail to see something that is the case: the spatial 
distribution of the chessboard's squares. This is what allows him to maintain that purple 
is nothing over and above the red–blue chessboard, indistinctly —i.e. partially— 
perceived. Now suppose that purple is also presented to us as having some feature that 
the red–blue chessboard lacks. This would prevent equating purple with the red–blue 
chessboard indistinctly perceived. Our argument in this subsection is that our perception 
of the chessboard not only omits certain of its features —the specific spatial distribution 
of its parts— but also adds another: namely, the continuity of the purple.  As a result the 
purple ceases to be identical to the indistinctly perceived chessboard, and becomes some 
sort of additional layer covering the chessboard. To re-use the analogy with Russell’s 
                                                
26 See Textor (this volume) for considerations in favour of the view that holism may be congenial to 
Brentano’s theory of intentionality.  
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sense-data, in §3.1 we have argued that Brentano is committed to something close to 
unperceivable sense-data, which are arguably inconsistent. In the present section we 
wish to argue that Brentano is committed, further, to something like sense-data of 
sense-data. 
When we contemplate some uniformly red extent, say, redness appears to pervade, fill, 
or cover the region in question—to borrow expressions from Brentano himself (1995b, 
95). As it appears to us, no sub-region of the purple region is free from purple. 27  Call 
this explanandum “continuity.” 
 
(Phenomenal) Continuity: each phenomenal spatial part of a phenomenal purple 
(or blue or yellow...) extent is a phenomenal purple (or blue or yellow...) extent.28 
 
Where by “phenomenal” we mean “presented”; and where by “spatial part” we mean: 
 
Spatial part: x is a spatial part of y iff (i) x is a part of y; (ii) y is exactly localized 
at a region r; (iii) x is exactly localized at a region r’; (iv) r’ is a part of r. 
 
There seem to be only two possible ways of accounting for phenomenal continuity, each 
of which entails that the phenomenal purple cannot be identical with Brentano's 
chessboard indistinctly perceived. The first is to appeal to phenomenal “gunk,” that is, 
to the idea that colour extent appears to be infinitely divisible: 
 
Phenomenal gunk:  (i) each phenomenal spatial part of a phenomenal purple 
extent is a phenomenal purple extent; (ii) each phenomenal purple extent appears 
to have proper spatial parts. 
                                                
27 See Parsons (2007) on the cognate concept of sporadic location. 
28 That the continuity (uniformity, homogeneity) of mixtures is a mereo-topological concept has been 
argued by Sharvy (1983); Simons (1987), Needham (2007). It clearly won’t do to simply say that purple 
is continuous iff all parts of the purple are purple, for ex hypothesis, purple has non-purple parts: red and 
blue ones. 
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If this is how a phenomenal purple expanse is presented to us, then it cannot be identical 
to a red-blue chessboard indistinctly perceived. For the purple expanses appears to have 
only purple expanses as spatial parts, no matter how small these parts are; the 
chessboard, on the other hand, has non-purple spatial proper parts (namely, red and blue 
ones). 
The second way to account for the phenomenal spatial continuity of the purple (or any 
other simple or compound colour) is to appeal to phenomenally extended simples, that 
is, to the idea that some colour extents appear to be spatially indivisible: 
Phenomenally extended simples: (i) each phenomenal spatial part of a 
phenomenal purple extent is a phenomenal purple extent; (ii) some phenomenal 
purple extents appear to have no proper spatial parts. 
Brentano sometimes seems to favour the second option, such as when he says that 
because we cannot distinguish the places filled by blueness and by redness “we assume 
we have only one place before us.”(1981a, 72). But if this is how a phenomenal purple 
expanse is presented to us, then it cannot be identical to a red-blue chessboard 
indistinctly perceived either. For a phenomenal purple extended simple will then look to 
have no spatial proper parts; while, on Brentano’s proposal, any phenomenal purple 
extent looks to have spatial proper parts —namely red and blue ones (even if the exact 
location of such parts is not given in indistinct perception). 
Summing up, Brentano’s chessboard hypothesis entails that the smallest visible purple 
extents seem to have non-purple spatial proper parts (namely, red and blue ones). But 
Continuity requires that all sub-regions of a purple extent seem purple. Whether 
Continuity is interpreted in terms of gunk or extended simples, it entails that the purple 
expanses we experience seem to have no non-purple spatial proper parts.  The manifest 
purple is seen as spatially pervading some spatial area—either because it is seen as 
infinitely divisible into purple extents, or because it is seen as being made of indivisible 
purple extents—and therefore cannot be identified with the red-blue chessboard minus 
some unnoticed spatial peculiarity anymore. We see purple as having a certain 
property—spatial continuity—that the chessboard does not have. The purple we see 
becomes a colour in its own place, another layer of purple that covers the red-blue 
chessboard. We end up with a duplication of the purple: the purple as it manifests itself, 
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which is spatially continuous; and the purple as described by scientific psychology, 
discontinuous because constituted by alternately red and blue squares. 
Couldn’t Brentano bite that bullet and grant that the phenomenal purple and the red-blue 
chessboard are indeed distinct? Clearly not. The whole point of Brentano’s theory of 
compound colours, recall, is to reconcile Complexity with Impenetrability. But if the 
purple, as it appears to us, is distinct from the red-blue chessboard, both Complexity and 
Impenetrability are lost: 
 
Complexity is lost for once the manifest, continuous, purple, and the red-blue 
chessboard are distinguished, the manifest purple ceases to be complex: red and 
blue patches are no longer parts of the manifest purple (they are only parts of the 
chessboard, which is no more identical to the manifest purple). 
 
Impenetrability is lost for once the phenomenal purple and the chessboard are 
distinguished, the purple and the chessboard end up compenetrating: depending 
on the squares under consideration, either purple and blue or purple and red will 
be found in exactly the same place at exactly the same time (in the case of 
extended simples, the purple extent and a red square will not however share exact 
location for no purple extent will be small enough to be exactly co-located with 
such imperceptible squares; but still a purple extent will be exactly co-located 
with a collection of red and blue squares, which is enough to violate 
Impenetrability). 
In sum, if the chessboard hypothesis is true, then purple does not occupy its region of 
visual space in a pervasive or continuous fashion. Some of its sub-regions, namely all 
those sub-regions that are situated below the threshold of perceptibility, are not purple 
but alternately blue or red. The appearances of purple are, then, not only incomplete, but 
also deceptive: to account for the pervasiveness of the purple, one must abandon the 
identity between the apparent purple and the indistinctly perceived chessboard. To 
reconcile Impenetrability and Complexity, Brentano has to give up Continuity. 
Why not do so? The chief reason is that the view that phenomenal colours seem to fill 
certain regions, in the sense that, apparently, no sub-region of these regions remain free 
of them, has a strong intuitive appeal. As a meticulous descriptive psychologist, 
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Brentano should be willing to accommodate this phenomenological aspect of our colour 
experience. As a matter of fact, he is. In various places but prominently in his 
Descriptive Psychology, Brentano stress that qualities “fill” , “cover”, or  “pervade” 
spatial extents. Brentano stresses that sensory objects have both a spatial and a 
qualitative determinations (which he also calls “inseparable” or “distinctional” parts). 
As to the qualitative determination, he writes: 
[Sensory objects] have a second specific determination which, as a pervading part 
of the spatial determination, occupies the place […], [i.e.] fills the space […] these 
second specific determinations are called qualities (colour in the widest sense, 
tone or its analogue). (1995b, 95; our italics) 
Our second objection to Brentano, in sum, is that although he is committed to them, he 
fails to reconcile Impenetrability, Complexity and Continuity. 
 
3.3. Brentano’s account of the continuous to the rescue? 
One possible reply on behalf of Brentano, is to appeal to his sophisticated theory of the 
continuous. Perhaps this theory provides a way of accounting for Continuity that is 
compatible with Impenetrability and Complexity? As we shall now argue, however, 
Brentano’s theory of the perception of continuity, for all its virtues, fails to properly 
account for the perception of the continuity of compound colours (as he understand 
them). 
Brentano develops his theory of continuity mainly in his Philosophische 
Untersuchungen zu Raum, Zeit und Kontinuum (1976, English translation, 1988).29 To 
put it very succinctly, the theory consists, first, in the claim that each spatially extended 
entity is divisible into (potentially) infinitely many proper parts that are spatially 
extended themselves (Brentano is fiercely opposed to the idea that space is a dense set 
of points); second, in the claim that all these proper parts entertain a considerable 
number of contact relations between one another, where contact is understood as a 
coincidence of their (non-extended) boundaries.30 
                                                
29 On Brentano’s theory of the continuous see notably Chisholm (1993), Zimmerman (1996), Albertazzi 
(2006, chap. 7). 
30 See section 2.1 above.  
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But how, Brentano asks, is it then possible to perceive continuity given that the proper 
spatial parts and the boundaries of the metaphysical continuous fall beyond our capacity 
of discrimination? Here again, Brentano makes use of his chessboard account, which he 
first introduces to deal with compound colours (Brentano 1988, 8, 147). Phenomenal 
spatial continuity, he holds, is the indistinct perception of metaphysical spatial 
continuity. His idea is that spatial continuity is presented to us as follows: we have the 
impression that the colour extent that we see has a high number of spatial proper parts, 
and that these proper parts entertain an important number of contact relations between 
one another, without however seeing precisely what these parts or their boundaries are, 
nor where they enter into contact. He writes: 
Certainly we cannot distinguish the individual points and boundaries in the 
continuum that presents itself to us, just as we could not distinguish the individual 
red positions in the divided chessboard. Yet this does not hinder us in 
apprehending with complete certainty that boundaries and coincidences of 
boundaries are innumerably present in the whole in question. (Brentano 1988, 9; 
see also 147) 
We tend to think that it is neither necessary nor sufficient to be presented with 
numberless “coincidences of boundaries” in an extent to have the impression that that 
extent is continuously filled with a colour. This is not the place, however, to embark on 
a critique of Brentano’s theory of the perception of the continuous. Our point is more 
modest: that Brentano’s account of the perception of the continuous fails to apply to the 
perception of the continuity of compound colours (as he construes them). 
Let us grant both Brentano’s account of the perception of the continuous (in terms of an 
indistinct perception of numerous coincidences of boundaries) and Brentano’s account 
of the perception of the purple (in terms of an indistinct perception of numerous red and 
blue squares), and consider the experience of a uniformly purple extent. Brentano’s 
view on the perception of continuity, we submit, accounts for the fact that the purple 
extent appears entirely filled by colours. But it does not account for the fact that the 
purple extent appears entirely filled by purple. To see that, consider first the perception 
of continuity in the case of elementary colours. 
It is easy indeed to see how Brentano can account for the continuity of elementary 
colours: a yellow extent will be presented as continuously yellow, for it will be seen as 
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made up of numberless yellow sub-extents, whose boundaries coincide, although where 
exactly these sub-extents and overlapping boundaries lie will not be distinctly 
perceived. 
But now consider compound colours. A purple extent will be presented as made up of 
numberless red and blue sub-extents, whose boundaries coincide, although where 
exactly these sub-extents and boundaries lie will not be perceived. Purple is seen as a 
multiplicity of red and blue patches somewhere entering in contact. But this does not 
help in explaining the phenomenal continuity of the purple. What would be needed, for 
get such a continuity, is an indistinct perception of numberless purple tiles with their 
numberless coinciding boundaries. This cannot happen in Brentano’s hypothesis, for 
there are no purple unnoticeable tiles in contact: there are only blue and red ones. 
Hence, thanks to his theory of the perception of the continuous, Brentano is perhaps in a 
position to explain why there seems to be no colour-less sub-region in a purple extent; 
but he cannot explain why there seem to be no purple-less sub-region in a purple extent. 
Yet, that no sub-region of the purple region seems free from purple, is precisely what 
Continuity is meant to capture. 
Wrapping up this section, Brentano’s proposal to reconcile Complexity and 
Impenetrability faces two objections. First, it entails the existence of intentionally in-
existent objects too small to be perceived (each individual square of the chessboard). 
Second, it entails that compound colours, contrary to elementary ones, can never seem 
to pervade their regions: while all (distinctly or indistinctly) perceivable sub-regions of 
a yellow expanse seem yellow, there always (indistinctly) appears to be some sub-
regions of a purple extent which are not purple. Continuity is lost. 
 
4. An alternative to Brentano’s chessboard: non-spatial parts 
4.1 Brentano vs. Aristotle 
The two problems that we have raised against Brentano’s theory of compound 
colours—from the imperceptibility and discontinuity of colours—have a common 
origin. Brentano’s theory essentially provides an epistemological solution to the 
question of compound colours: compound colours appear to us because of the limits of 
our discrimination capacities. Compound colours are not a new kind of intentional 
object but a configuration of elementary colours indistinctly perceived. On such an 
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approach, as Aristotle noted, a being of perfect acuity, such as Lynceus, could never 
have a sensation of phenomenal purple. Fundamentally, then, only elementary colours 
exist. If a mixture is a perfectly homogeneous combination of the elements it contains, 
then, according to Brentano, there are no mixtures of colour. Aristotle had already noted 
that epistemological theories of this kind lead to a negation of the reality of mixtures: 
When the combining constituents have been divided into parts so small, and have 
been juxtaposed in such a manner, that perception fails to discriminate them one 
from another, have they then been combined? […] so long as the constituents are 
preserved in small particles, we must not speak of them as combined.  (For this 
will be a composition instead of a blending or combination; nor will the part 
exhibit the same ratio between its constituents as the whole. But we maintain that, 
if combination has taken place, the compound must be uniform—any part of such 
a compound being the same as the whole, just as any part of water is water; 
whereas, if combination is composition of the small particles, nothing of the kind 
will happen. On the contrary, the constituents will only be combined relatively to 
perception; and the same thing will be combined to one percipient, if his sight is 
not sharp—while to the eye of Lynceus nothing will be combined.) (On 
Generation and Corruption, trad. J. Barnes, 327b34-328a18)  
Contrary to Brentano, Aristotle presents a metaphysical theory of the nature of 
mixtures. Although his theory has a different scope—Aristotle is interested in physical 
mixtures and not so much in phenomenal mixtures—it is still useful to contrast it with 
Brentano’s theory. For Aristotle, the problem is not so much reconciling the multiplicity 
of the components of a mixture with their impenetrability, but reconciling the 
multiplicity and homogeneity of the mixture. His dilemma is the following: either the 
components continue to exist within the mixture, in which case the mixture is not really 
homogeneous—and, thus, is not a real mixture, or the components cease to exist when 
the mixture is created, in which case the mixture is not a real mixture, but a new simple 
element. Aristotle’s solution to this dilemma consists in saying that the components of a 
mixture continue to exist potentially within the mixture. 
Brentano (1981a, 69-70) raises the following objection against Aristotle: By conceiving 
of mixtures as a composition of existents and non-existents, Aristotle is led to attribute 
some degree of existence to non-existent entities. Brentano could have added that 
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Aristotle’s solution does not really avoid the compenetration of ingredients: in the same 
way as the mixture they compose, the ingredients all exist, even if only potentially, in 
the same place at the same time.31 This conclusion seems to confirm Brentano’s initial 
doubts: the only solution for reconciling the impenetrability and complexity of colours 
is to adopt an epistemological theory of mixtures. Metaphysical theories, which attempt 
to account for mixtures without invoking the limits of our capacities of discrimination, 
end up violating the impenetrability of the components. In what follows, we shall 
suggest that this conclusion is too hasty and that a metaphysical account of compound 
colours can be given that reconciles Complexity, Impenetrability and Continuity. 
 
4.2 A third way: non-spatial component colours 
Let us recall our three desiderata: 32 
Complexity: compound colours—purple, orange, green, etc.—are colours 
composed of at least two other colours. 
Impenetrability: it is impossible for two determinate colours of a same bearer to 
fill exactly the same area at exactly the same time. 
Continuity: each spatial part of a purple (or blue or yellow...) extent is a purple 
(or blue or yellow...) extent. 
This may first seem to constitute an inconsistent triad, but that is not the case. It is only 
when we add the tacit hypothesis that the component colours are spatial parts of 
compound ones that an incompatibility appears. Because he accepts that the red and 
blue parts that compose purple must be spatial parts, Brentano is led to his chessboard 
account, which, we have argued, ends up conflicting with Continuity. 
Rejecting that tacit hypothesis, we want to close by suggesting, paves the way for a 
metaphysical theory of compound colours that guarantees their complexity as well as the 
impenetrability of their components⎯important to Brentano⎯and the homogeneity or 
continuity of mixtures⎯important to Aristotle. This theory, in short, holds that the 
                                                
31 See Sharvy (1983) and Fine (1995).  
32 For ease of presentation, we have here dropped all explicit mention of phenomenal (colours, extents or 
parts) in these definitions. To the extent that, in accordance with Brentano, we only speak here of 
phenomenal colours, regions, and their parts, we shall henceforth assume that this restriction to 
phenomenal objects goes without saying. 
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component colours, instead of continuing to exist potentially in the mixture as Aristotle 
thought, continue to exist non-spatially within it. Let us define the non-spatial parts of a 
spatial thing as follows: 
Non-spatial part: x is a non-spatial part of y iff (i) x is a part of y; (ii) y is exactly 
localized at a region r; (iii) x is not located at any region. 
Both Brentano and Aristotle consider the ingredients of a mixture to be spatial parts of 
it. They differ when it comes to the question about whether these parts are proper or 
improper. On Brentano’s view, the composing colours are located at proper parts of the 
regions occupied by compound colours: they are not exactly co-located with the 
compound colour, but located at sub-regions of the region that the compound colour 
occupies (at every second parcel of the chessboard). He thus avoids compenetration. 
The cost of this is the loss of the real continuity of mixtures. On Aristotle’s view, the 
composing colours are located at improper parts of the regions occupied by compound 
colours: they are exactly co-located with the compound colours that they constitute. The 
homogeneity of mixtures is thus saved, at the cost of abandoning the impenetrability of 
their components —a weak violation of impenetrability, however, for it remains true 
that actual colours never compenetrate. 
To reconcile the multiplicity of the parts of a mixture, its homogeneity and the 
impenetrability of its components, it is sufficient, however, to reject the hypothesis, 
common to Aristotle and Brentano, that the parts that compose a mixture are spatial 
parts. That proposal seems to have never been envisaged seriously.33 Our goal in the 
remainder of this paper is not to propose a full-fledged defence of that proposal, but 
only to provide some preliminary defence of it so as to suggest that the hypothesis 
might be worth exploring further. 
So the proposal is that blue and red, although parts of purple, are not spatial parts of 
purple. Purple occupies a region of sensory space, but the blue and red that compose it 
do not. A chromatic mixture—purple—is a concrete entity located in space, which has 
abstract parts—red and blue—that are not themselves located in space. A purple extent 
                                                
33 Fine  (1995, §1) touches upon the idea, but readily rejects it: “For suppose that one of the ingredients is 
part of the mixture.  Then surely it has a location; and given that it has a location, surely that location is 
included in the location of the mixture.” 
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also has spatial parts (sub-regions), but crucially, all its spatial parts are themselves 
purple extents. Consequently, each sub-region of a purple extent contains some blue and 
some red as non-spatial parts. Of course, when we see it as a single elementary colour, 
blue is located in sensory space in the same way as purple. Yet when it is a part of 
purple, blue ceases to be located in sensory space: in this case, only purple occupies 
sensory space. Thus, although it is true that every region and sub-region which seems 
purple seems partly blue and partly red, it is not true that the blue that contributes to 
make up purple seems extended. This is in marked contrast to the blue that occurs 
without red in a pure blue extent. So an inherent cost of the proposal is that some 
colours —the elementary ones— have two modes of existence: either they exist in 
space, or, when they are component colours, they exist non-spatially. 
The proposal has several advantages. First, following Aristotle, it provides a 
metaphysical theory of mixtures (in opposition to Brentano’s epistemological approach, 
which relies on thresholds of perceptibility). Second, it accommodates the two 
explananda dear to Brentano: purple is composed of red and blue; nevertheless red and 
blue never compenetrate—for the simple reason that, on this account, component 
colours don’t have locations in sensory space. Third, Continuity is also accounted for: 
although some parts of a purple extent will be red or blue, no spatial part of a purple 
extent will ever be red or blue. Fourth, the proposal avoids the objection that Brentano 
raises against Aristotle: it doesn’t lead to any sort of reification of non-existent entities: 
the elements of the mixture don’t keep existing potentially, but abstractly, outside 
space. 
These advantages notwithstanding, this suggestion invokes two sets of worries. The first 
pertains to the kind of parthood relation on which it relies. Mereological composition 
seems excluded, for it cannot take us from non-spatial entities (the component colours) 
to spatial ones. Even those who reject composition as identity are not willing to say that 
non-spatial parts can sum up to spatial wholes. So the composition at stake has to be 
non-mereological.  Can we reach some more positive characterisation of it? Brentano, 
as we saw, introduced the concept of dependent/inseparable part.34 Qualities and places 
                                                
34 Which he also call “distinctional” [distinktionelle] parts (1995b, 16) 
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are for him inseparable parts of sensory objects, for they are mutually dependent. The 
same seems to hold of component colours, we submit: they are mutually dependent 
parts of compound colours. Otherwise if would be possible for, say, yellow to exist non-
spatially even when unmixed with other colours. So red and blue have to be non-spatial, 
non-mereological and mutually dependent parts of yellow. More needs to be said, 
clearly, about that specific sort of mutual dependence. For not all mutually dependent 
parts yield a mixture of those. The mutual dependence between qualities and extension, 
for instance, does not yield to any ratio or proportion. We cannot sensibly say that a red 
disc contains more redness than roundness, but we surely can say that some purple 
shade contains more redness than blueness. 
A second set of worries pertains to the prima facie implausibility of the claim that 
several colours can be part of another without being spatially located in the place where 
the other is located. This prima facie implausibility, we submit, can partly be softened 
by mentioning other examples where dependent parts do not share the location of the 
whole they constitute. Let us discuss two such examples. 
Consider, first, the conjunction of the views (i) that mental episodes are constituents of 
persons, (ii) that mental episodes lack spatial location (even if they do have a temporal 
location), (iii) that persons have spatial location. That conjunction of views was popular 
among modern philosophers, it was upheld by Brentano, and remains quite plausible, in 
our opinion, from the standpoint of descriptive philosophy of mind. When Julie is in the 
kitchen, neither her cheekiness, nor her love of Paul, are located in the kitchen. Yet they 
are constituents of Julie. So we have non-spatial constituents of a spatial thing. One 
limit of this example, however, is that Julie is only partly constituted by her mental 
episodes. She also has a body, which is a spatial constituent of her, and which explains 
her location. On our proposal, in contrast, the purple only has non-spatial constituents. 
Can we find examples of entities entirely composed of non-spatial constituents, but 
which nevertheless have a spatial location? 
Consider, second, the view that bodies are bundles of universals. On this view, 
universals are (non-mereological and compresent) constituents of bodies. Now bodies 
are located in space. Does that entail that the universals that compose them are also 
located in space? Not necessarily. Costa draws the following useful distinction: 
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According to immanentism, universals are present in space by being located at 
regions thereof. According to transcendentism, universals are present in space 
only by being instantiated by objects which, in turn, are located at regions of 
space. (Costa, forthcoming). 
(As Costa notes, this distinction pertains to the location of universals, and is orthogonal 
to more familiar distinction, due to David Armstrong, between Aristotelian and Platonic 
universals, which pertains to the exemplification of universals.) The bundle theorist who 
endorses transcendentism holds a position akin to our proposal: non-located constituents 
(the universals) entirely compose a located whole (the body). Note that our point is not 
that this version of the bundle theory is true; all our argument requires is that it is 
intelligible. If it is, our proposal also is. 
Costa’s distinction is useful in another respect. For the transcendentist, although he 
rejects the location of universals, still grants that universals are present in space by 
being exemplified by objects located in space. Building on that proposal, we can 
maintain that component colours, although there are not located where the compound 
colours are, are nevertheless present in these locations —by composing the colours 
which is located in this place. The essential point is that purple doesn’t occupy our 
sensory space in the same way as the elementary colours that compose it: purple is 
located in sensory space, while its blue and red components are not located in space, but 
may still be said to be present in space via the purple that they constitute. 
Let us, to conclude, mention two more general reasons to prefer our proposal that the 
component colours of a compound colour are not spatial parts of it, to Brentano’s 
chessboard account. 
The first is that the phenomenal difference between elementary and compound colours 
does not seem to have anything to do with the way they fill space. Spatial pervasiveness 
holds in the same manner for simple and compound colours. As far as appearances are 
concerned, a purple extent does not leave more regions free from purple than a red 
extent leaves regions free from redness. If it is true that we have the impression that 
purple fills or pervades some sensory region uniformly, then we should have the 
impression that each and every one of the its sub-regions is also uniformly purple. The 
purple is not presented to us as possibly dissolving into blue and red parts below some 
threshold. In Aristotle’s words, if phenomenal yellow is (spatially) homeomerous (i.e., 
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if all the spatial parts of yellow are themselves yellow35), then the same is true for 
phenomenal purple. The simple fact that we can easily conceive of an appearance of 
purple infinitely divisible into purple proper-parts suggests that there is no sign 
whatsoever in the presentation of purple of the impossibility of a homogeneous division 
below a given threshold. The phenomenological difference between elementary and 
compound colours does not lie the fact that only the former seems to be spatially 
divisible in a homogeneous fashion. But this is exactly what any rejection or weakening 
of Continuity —à la Brentano— amounts to claim. 
Second, in contrast to Brentano’s theory that conjectures a phenomenal chessboard that 
is nowhere to be found in experience, our proposal sticks to the letter of what we see, 
according to Brentano’s own description of such experiences. He rightly insists (i) that 
compound qualities are presented to us as having simple qualities such as their 
components or parts (=Complexity), and (ii) that the location of these component 
qualities is not presented in our perception. Instead of surmising that there is such a 
location by introducing an inaccessible chessboard, we suggest staying right there: if 
everything presented to us when we see purple is “a multiplicity of the parts,” whose 
locations elude us, why should we introduce the troublesome hypothesis that these parts 
have a location? Why not stick to the appearances? If there is no phenomenological 
absurdity in the idea of seeing blue within purple without seeing where blue is in the 
purple (a description which Brentano rightly endorses), there should be no conceptual 
absurdity in admitting that blue is within purple without being anywhere within purple, 
either.36 
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